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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we study a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer 
and a retailer of a single product with numerous end product customers. The key feature 
differentiating this paper from the extant literature in CLSC is that our model is 
retailer-driven while the traditional CLSC models have been manufacturer-driven. This 
study is motivated by the emergence of super retailers such as Wal-Mart. Under these 
circumstances, we show how the retailer leads and the manufacturer follows in 
determining the wholesale and retail prices in the forward flow and the used product 
collecting and return prices in the reverse flow. In particular, we show via numerical 
examples a loss leader pricing behavior of the retailer who intentionally loses money for 
each unit returned in the reverse flow so as to make the maximum total profit considering 
both forward and reverse flows. Next, we investigate a centrally coordinated CLSC of the 
retailer and the manufacturer as well as the manufacturer-driven model, and compare the 
price and profit implications with the retailer-driven model. Also, we examine various 
ramifications of the retailer-driven model with respect to the coordination mechanisms, 
policy implications, and third-party logistics. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Supply Chain Power 
There have been numerous papers in the manufacturer-retailer supply chain literature 
analyzing economic and managerial aspects based on production-oriented perspectives. In 
such papers, the implicit assumption is that products are made by manufacturers with 
some market power and are sold ultimately to final consumers. The manufacturer often 
leads the supply chain by deciding how many units to produce and at what price to sell. 
The retailer is often of less importance in terms of value-addition in the supply chain, and 
is treated as an intermediary between the manufacturer and the end product consumers 
(see e.g., Dawson, 2000).  
However, the recent years have witnessed dramatic changes in the supply power 
structure and the role of the retailer in the supply chain. First, the economy has shifted 
into services-oriented systems. In such systems, part of the service is the product made by 
the manufacturer but part of it is made by the retailer, often at the store. What the 
consumer buys is not only the product from the manufacturer, but also all kinds of 
supportive and shopping service from the retailer, e.g., the delivery and setup of new 
electronics, the length of the queue at the pay point. Even in case that the manufacturer 
determines what to produce and sell, the retailer still produces the “experience” which the 
consumer buys. In many cases, the retailer has better knowledge of the demand of the 
consumer and seeks to procure (get made or buy from the manufacturer) the components 
of the service that the consumer wants. Therefore the retailer has become the central 
player in the supply chain.  
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Second, we have seen the rise of the “super retailers”. With the help of the 
information technology, more effectible logistics networks and the globalization of the 
economy, these super retailers emerged and are able to seek competitive manufacturers 
worldwide. For example, Wal-mart has exerted tremendous supply chain power over their 
suppliers in the last decade.  
Although in some monopolistic or oligopolistic markets the manufacturer is still able 
to charge above competitive prices, Gilo (1999) argues that the conventional wisdom that 
the manufacturer in noncompetitive markets has power to charge supra-competitive price 
is not necessarily correct. The bargaining power has at least partially, if not all, shifted to 
the retailer in many supply chains. 
 
1.2 Remanufacturing 
The importance of product remanufacturing has been widely recognized in the 
literature and in practice. In the US, the remanufacturing industry has become a $53 
billion industry (Lund, 1998) and employed 480,000 people per year according to 
National Center for Remanufacturing and Resource Recovery (NC3R, 2005).  
However, many of the remanufacturing systems in the industry are waste stream 
systems (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2001) in which efforts are placed to diverting 
discarded products from landfills by making producers responsible for the collection and 
reuse of their products. The feature of the waste stream system is that the returns are 
random and based on regulations or citizenship; the producers passively accept all 
product returns from the waste stream and manage to minimize the disposing and related 
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operating cost.  
 The counterpart of the waste stream system is the market-driven system (Guide and 
Van Wassenhove, 2001), which has attracted more attention in recent years. In such 
systems, the remanufacturing practice is profitable and the end-users are motivated to 
return end-of-life products by financial incentives, such as cash, credit toward a new unit, 
etc. The distinction of the market-driven system is the manufacturer’s active control over 
the product returns.  
For example, Xerox Corporation provides prepaid mailboxes so that customers can 
return their used copy or print cartridges for free; to further motivate product returns in 
Australia, Xerox credits A$10 (US$7) for each cartridge returned (Kerr, 2000). 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) recently had a Trade-In program, which gives up to $400 mail-in 
rebate to the customers who purchase a new printer and return an old one directly to HP 
(http://www.hp.com/). Another example is Staples, a major office product retailer store. 
Staples recently offered a $3 coupon for each returned cartridge 
(http://www.rechargermag.com/article.asp?id=200511040). The returned cartridges are 
remanufactured into Staples-brand cartridges or recycled. “Customers have been aware of 
Staples as a destination for toner and ink for a while now,” Owen Davis of Staples said, 
‘We have made recycling available for a number of years, but this new program will 
hopefully encourage those who had previously not considered recycling their cartridges to 
do so”. In addition, Guide and Van Wassenhove (2001) provides a case study of how 
ReCellular, Inc., a cell phone remanufacturer, transforms from a waste stream system to a 
market-driven system by providing a table of prices for specific cell phones with specific 
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levels of quality.  
Recently, there is one more driving force behind the market-driven remanufacturing 
system, i.e., the green design or design for reuse concept which aims to incorporate the 
idea of product return and easy-disassembly into new product design. In such systems, 
how to effectively control the product returns and how to interact with the collecting party 
is even more strategically crucial to the remanufacturer. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
There is literature addressing the super retailer and the remanufacturing practice 
separately. However, there are few papers in the extant literature addressing both issues in 
a model. Motivated by this fact, the purpose of the research is to investigate the pricing 
strategies of a two-echelon market-driven closed-loop remanufacturing supply chain with 
the retailer as the Stackelberg leader. To provide comparison, we also discuss the centrally 
coordinated supply chain and the manufacturer-driven supply chain. More specifically, 
we seek answers to the following questions: 
(1) How to set the prices in the market-driven remanufacturing supply chain, and 
how are the prices affected by the supply chain power structure? 
(2) How is the profit of each party in the supply chain affected by the supply chain 
power structure? 
(3) How the model can be used in the decision making? 
We analyze the model in a steady-state setting. Key findings of the model show that 
the Stackelberg leader in the supply chain gives up the profit from the reverse flow and 
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makes profit from the forward flow only. This is an interesting finding because this is a 
phenomenon very similar to the “loss leader pricing” policy in the economics literature. 
Loss leader pricing is “a pricing strategy in which retailers set very low prices, sometimes 
below cost, for some products to lure customers into stores” (Hess and Gerstner, 1987). 
The idea is that by using loss leader pricing policy, while retailers lose profit in these 
products, they could generate higher profits from other products. In this research, we 
observe that the Stackelberg leader in the supply chain adopt the loss leader pricing to the 
reverse flow.  
In a broad sense, this research contributes to our understanding of the pricing 
strategies of the basic two-echelon market-driven closed-loop remanufacturing supply 
chain with different supply chain power structures.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Literature review is given in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 discusses the formulation and solution of the two-echelon retailer-driven 
supply chain model, specifically in the linear demand and return rate function form. In 
Chapter 4 we provide numerical analysis of the retailer-driven supply chain model in the 
linear function form and show the loss leader pricing policy used by the retailer. Chapter 
5 presents a limited optimality analysis to help gain an intuitive explanation of loss leader 
pricing policy in the retailer-driven supply chain model. Chapter 6 studies the centrally 
coordinated supply chain and manufacturer-driven supply chain. These two supply chain 
models have been studied in a few literatures, but we provide the models with different 
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assumptions and derive the conclusion in a more general form. In Chapter 7 we present 
some discussion about the comparison of the models, the supply chain coordination issues, 
the policy implications and a third party collecting model extended from the basic model. 
Summary and future work is given in Chapter 8. To make the main contents concise and 
focused, most of the mathematical proof is moved to Appendix.  
 
1.5 Definitions of Terms 
This is a list of the basic terms used in the paper.  
cm : the unit cost of manufacturing from raw materials. 
cr : the unit cost of remanufacturing from a returned product. 
∆=cm-cr>0 : the direct savings from remanufacturing for the manufacturer. 
w : wholesale price charged by the manufacturer to the retailer. 
p : retail price charged by the retailer to the customer. 
β=p/w : the forward flow price multiplier. 
b : the unit return price paid by the manufacturer to the retailer for a returned product. 
c : the unit collecting price paid by the retailer to the customer for a returned product. 
λ=c/b : the reverse flow price multiplier. 
D(p) : the demand function of the product. 
r(c) : the return rate function of the used product, r(c)∈[0, 1]. 
M
R∏ , MM∏ , MC∏  : Manufacturer’s profit in the retailer-driven supply chain, in the 
manufacturer-driven supply chain, and in the centrally coordinated supply chain 
respectively.  
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R
R∏ , RM∏ , RC∏  : Retailer’s profit in the retailer-driven supply chain, in the 
manufacturer-driven supply chain, and in the centrally coordinated supply chain 
respectively.  
R
RDMCΠ  : Retailer’s profit in the Retailer-driven Manufacturer-collecting model. 
*
RDMC
*
RDMC cb =  : The unit price paid by the manufacturer (collector) to the customer 
for returning a used product in the Retailer-driven Manufacturer-collecting model. 
*
R
*
R  , cb , *Rλ  : The optimal return price, optimal collecting price and optimal reverse 
flow price multiplier respectively in the retailer-driven (retailer-collecting) model. 
3PΠ  : The profit of the 3rd party in the third party model 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE 
 In this section, we present a review of several relevant streams of previous work in 
supply chain management and remanufacturing.  
One stream of literature studies the supply chain power structure and its impact on 
the supply chain performance. Lau and Lau (2005) summarizes a list of the supply chain 
gaming processes commonly found in practice. Their research found that each of the 
gaming processes in the list appears to be no less plausible than the others in the practice. 
To model a super retailer as the Stackelberg leader in the supply chain, they found two 
basic approaches: a dollar amount markup and a percentage markup: In the dollar amount 
markup, the retailer declares a fixed dollar amount β and sets the retail price as p = w + β 
(where w is the wholesale price and p is the retail price). In the percentage markup, the 
retailer declares a fixed percentage amount β and sets the retail price as p = wβ. A similar 
modeling approach could be found in Ertek and Griffin (2002), which studies the 
supplier- and buyer-driven supply chains in a two stage supply chain with the forward 
flow only. In their paper, the buyer has dominant power in the buyer-driven supply chain 
and acts first to declare a non-negative mark-up α  and non-negative price multiplier β  
and states that she will set price wp βα += , where w is the supplier’s price. Their 
research finds that it is optimal for the buyer to set the mark-up α  to zero and use only a 
multiplier β . Our model will apply a similar approach as above. Other papers studying 
the supply chain power include Kohli and Park (1989), Grant (1999), Munson et al. 
(1999), Messinger and Narasimhan (1995), Dawson (2000), etc. 
A growing literature in operations management addresses remanufacturing and 
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reverse logistics issue. Fleischmann et al.(1997) and Guide et al.(2000) provide 
comprehensive reviews of remanufacturing research. The three categories of 
remanufacturing issues identified by these reviews are production planning and control 
(e.g., Souza et al. 2002), inventory control (e.g., Toktay et al. 2000) and material planning 
(e.g., Ferrer and Whybark, 2001; Inderfurth, 2004). The common underlying assumption 
in these papers is that the decisions are made by a central decision maker.  
 Many papers in the traditional operations management and marketing area address 
the decentralized decision process and coordination issue in the supply chain. Thomas 
and Griffin (1996) provides a review of models of coordination mechanisms in the supply 
chain to reduce operating cost. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) and McGuire and 
Staelin(1983), from the marketing point of view, analyze the pricing issue of each party in 
the supply chain. The common feature of these papers is that they only look at the 
forward flow of product in the supply chain. 
There are a few papers that combine the above two streams and address the 
decentralized decision process and coordination issue in a supply chain with both forward 
and reverse flows. Savaskan et al. (2004), by assuming that the manufacturer has 
sufficient supply chain power and acts as a Stackelberg leader, studies the problem of 
choosing the appropriate reverse supply chain structure for the collection of used products 
from customers. Their research demonstrates that the retailer is the most effective 
undertaker of returned product collection activity for the manufacturer. Majumder and 
Groenevelt (2001) presents a competition model in remanufacturing from strategic 
perspective, and suggests that incentive should be given to OEM manufacturer to 
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decrease remanufacturing cost or increase product returns. 
 Finally, there is a growing research interest in the decision models for the used 
product acquisition. Instead of assuming that the product returns are an exogenous 
process and the remanufacturer passively accepts product returns, Guide and Van 
Wassenhove (2001) provides a framework of the market-driven product acquisition 
system to effectively control product returns, especially product quality. Guide et al. 
(2003) also provides a model of the acquisition management.  
An interesting finding of this research coincides with a phenomenon called the “loss 
leader pricing” policy in the economics literature. Loss leader pricing is also referred to as 
“featuring” in some literature (e.g., Nelson and Hike 1986). Hess and Gerstner (1987) 
provides the rationale of loss leader pricing policy and studies the effects of such pricing 
policy on the retailer’s profit and market outcomes, given the retailer could accurately 
predict demand. Other literature regarding loss leader pricing includes Busch and 
Houston (1985) and DeGraba (2006). Even through our model does not set out to find an 
optimal loss leader pricing strategy, the results from profit maximization does lead to such 
pricing phenomenon.  
 Our research draws on and contributes to the above streams by developing a 
two-echelon market-driven closed-loop remanufacturing supply chain. Different scenarios 
of the supply chain power structure and the market-driven behavior of the product returns 
are integrated into the model.  
 The relevant literature is summarized in the following Table 1. 
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Table 1. Literature Review 
Supply Chain Power Lau and Lau (2005): dollar amount and percentage markup retailer 
Ertek and Griffin (2002): mixed markup retailer 
Other: Kohli and Park (1989), Munson et al. (1999), Grant (1999), 
Messinger and Narasimhan (1995), Dawson (2000) 
Remanufacturing Review 
Fleischmann et 
al.(1997) 
Guide et al.(2000) 
Production Planning: Souza et al. (2002) 
Inventory Control: Toktay el al. (2000) 
Material Planning: Ferrer and Whybark 
(2001), Inderfurth (2004) 
Traditional Supply Chain 
Management (SCM) 
Thomas and Griffin (1996); Jeuland and Shugan 
(1983)McGuire and Staelin(1983), etc. 
SCM with Remanufacturing Savaskan et al. (2004), Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) 
Used Product Acquisition 
(Market-driven) 
Guide and Van Wassenhove (2001), Guide et al. (2003) 
Loss Leader Pricing  Hess and Gerstner (1987), Nelson, P.B. and Hike(1986), 
Busch and Houston(1985), DeGraba(2006). 
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CHAPTER 3. RETAILER-DRIVEN MODEL 
In this chapter, we elaborate the retailer-driven closed-loop supply chain model. Our 
primary focus is to investigate the retailer-driven model because (1) there is an emerging 
trend that the retailer has more market power and leadership than the manufacturer 
(Dawson, 2000); (2) there are few papers in the extant literature addressing the 
retailer-driven scenario (cf. there are numerous papers addressing the 
manufacturer-driven scenario).  
The organization of the chapter is: section 3.1 is assumption and notation, followed 
by the section 3.2 problem formulation. In section 3.3, we introduce the linear demand 
and linear return rate functions. Section 3.4 gives an intermediate solution of the model 
with the linear function form. 
 
3.1 Assumptions and Notations 
The retailer-driven two-echelon closed-loop supply chain with product 
remanufacturing is illustrated in Figure 1. The manufacturer manufactures a new product 
from raw materials with unit cost of cm, or remanufactures a returned product into a new 
one with unit cost of cr. We assume there is no distinction between the manufactured and 
remanufactured products (see Kerr 2000 for an example of photocopier) and ∆=cm-cr>0, 
i.e., the remanufacturing is potentially profitable (∆ is referred as direct savings from 
remanufacturing in this paper).  
We also assume that the manufacturer could control the unit wholesale price of the 
new product (w>0) and the unit return price of the returned product from the retailer 
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(b>0). The retailer-driven means that the retailer has sufficient supply chain power over 
the manufacturer to act as a Stackelberg leader. As in many literatures (see e.g., Lau and 
Lau, 2005; Ertek and Griffin, 2002), we assume that the Stackelberg gaming process is 
that the retailer takes an active role and declares two price multipliers (β>0 and λ>0) and 
states that the retail price p and collecting price c will be set as p=βw and c=λb. The 
retailer could predict the manufacturer’s reaction (setting of w and b) given her action 
(setting of β and λ). By taking into account the manufacturer’s reaction, the retailer tries 
to obtain her maximal profit by choosing the optimal β and λ. The customer is paid c for a 
returned product.  
 
 
 
The demand by the customers for the product is D(p). The reverse flow is 
characterized by the return rate of the used product from the customers, r(c), which is a 
function of the collecting price c. The total amount of the returned product is D(p)r(c).  
We note that our model is a generalization of the traditional economic model with the 
forward flow only (see e.g., Varian 1992). Specifically when remanufacturing is not 
profitable (∆≤0) or when the customers never return any product (r(c)≡0), the reverse 
flow would not exist and our model is degenerated into the traditional forward-only 
Manufacturer Retailer 
D(p) 
r(c) b 
w 
c=λb 
p=βw 
Forward Flow 
Reverse Flow 
Figure 1. Closed-loop Two-echelon Supply Chain with Remanufacturing 
cm  cr 
Customers 
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model. 
We also have the following assumptions in our model that are essential to answer our 
research questions: 
(1) The model is considered in a steady-state setting; 
(2) Both the manufacturer and the retailer have access to the supply chain 
information consisting of the manufacturing cost, remanufacturing cost, demand function 
and return rate function;  
(3) All returned products are suitable for remanufacturing and the remanufacturing 
costs are constant. 
We note that several studies in the CLSC literature are based on similar assumptions 
(see e.g., Savaskan et al. 2004): 
 
3.2 Problem Formulation 
The profit of each member and the whole supply chain could found as follows. The 
retailer’s profit ∏R is 
)])(()[(        
))(()())((
cbcrwppD
cbcrpDwppDR
−+−=
−+−=Π
       (1) 
The retailer’s profit contains two parts: one is the profit from the forward flow by selling 
every new product (p-w); the other is the profit from the reverse flow by collecting every 
used product and returning it to the manufacturer (b-c). In other words, the retailer’s 
profit comes from acting firstly as the distribution agent and secondly as the collection 
agent. Recall that p=βw and c=λb.  
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The manufacturer’s profit ∏M is 
)])(()[(        
)()()]( ))(1()[(
bcrcmwpD
bcrpDcrcrcrcmwpDM
−∆+−=
−−−−=Π
   (2) 
Due to remanufacturing, the average unit production cost of the manufacturer is 
cm(1-r(c))+cr r(c), i.e., 1-r(c) proportion of total products will be manufactured from raw 
materials, and the remaining r(c) proportion will be remanufactured from returned 
products. The manufacturer also has to pay the retailer for the collecting service. Similar 
to the retailer’s profit, the manufacturer’s profit can be interpreted as two parts: one is the 
profit from the forward flow by selling every new product (w-cm), the other is the cost 
savings from the reverse flow by remanufacturing every used product (∆-b). 
The total supply chain profit ∏T is the sum of the profit of the retailer and the 
manufacturer: 
)])(()[( ccrcmppDMRT −∆+−=Π+Π=Π      (3) 
The Stackelberg game of the retailer-driven supply chain is the following two-step 
optimization problem: First find the optimal response function of the manufacturer b*(β, 
λ) and w*(β, λ) given the retailer’s declaration of β and λ. 
)bc,w (Max  arg}),(w),,({ M** λλβλβ ==∏= βpb
b,w
   (4) 
Then find the optimal solution for the retailer considering the manufacture’s reaction 
function.  
)),(w),,( (Max  arg},{ **R
,
** λβλβλβ
λβ
==∏= wbb     (5) 
 The sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a Stackelberg 
equilibrium of the retailer-driven supply chain is the concavity of MΠ with respect to b 
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and w and the concavity of the RΠ with respect to β and λ (Cachon and Netessine, 2006). 
 
3.3 Linear Demand and Linear Return Rate 
The analysis of the retailer-driven model under the general function form of D(p) and 
r(c) seems to yield few managerial insights and is often intractable. Instead, we utilize 
linear demand and linear return rate functions so as to obtain interesting managerial 
insights and economic implication. We do not consider nonlinear demand function for the 
retailer-driven model. 
The Linear demand function is widely used in economics and engineering literature 
and assumed to be in the form D(p)=u-vp (u>0, v>0, u>vp, see, e.g., Varian 1992).  
The linear return rate function r(c) in the linear model is assumed to be in the form 
]/1,0[  where,)( kckccr ∈= , in which k is the marginal return rate, i.e., one unit increase 
in c results in k unit increase of the product return rate. k reflects the customers’ 
willingness to return products. )(cr  is bounded above by 1, when all the products are 
returned to the supply chain. 1/k is the upper bound of the collecting price, because any 
collecting price larger than 1/k would not improve the return rate any more, i.e., the 
feasible region of c is [0, 1/k]. The linear function of )(cr  in the model is a first-degree 
approximation of many actual return rate functions (See Figure 2).  
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For most cases with practical parameter values, we could assume that k is sufficiently 
small so that 0 1/c k≤ <  (or r(c)<1) is always true for any reasonable c. In this paper, 
we will focus our attention on the case of 0 1/c k≤ <  (i.e., r(c)<1), but we also give the 
solution for the case 1/c k= (i.e., r(c)=1).  
 
3.4 Intermediate Solution 
In the retailer-driven model with linear demand and linear return rate functions, we 
obtain an intermediate solution as follows.  
The manufacturer’s profit given the retailer’s announcement of β and λ is  
)])(b()[w(  )])(()[( brcmwβDbcrcmwpDM −∆+−=−∆+−=Π λ  
where D(p)=u-vp and ]/1,0[  ,)( kckccr ∈= . 
We focus our attention on the case of r(c)<1. First we can find that the 
manufacturer’s reaction functions by MMax Π over w and b. The optimal wholesale 
price w and optimal return price b given the retailer’s announcement of β and λ are: 
8/2/)2/(),( 2* ∆−+= λβλβ kcmvuw  and 2/),(* ∆=λβb  
Notice ),(* λβb  is independent on β and λ, i.e., the optimal return price *b ≡∆/2.  
Then consider ∏R= D(p)[p-w+r(c)(b-c)]=D(wβ)[wβ-w+kbλ(b-bλ)]. By taking into 
c 
r 
1 
0 
1/k 
k 
Figure 2. Linear Return Rate Function 
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account the manufacturer’s reaction functions ),(* λβw and ),(* λβb , we find the retailer’s 
problem is 
β
λβλββλββλβ
v
cmkvukvvcmuMax R
64
)]4(4)][32() )(1(4[),( 
22
−∆+−+∆−+−
=Π   (6) 
After solving Expression (6) and finding the optimal β*, λ*, we can then find the optimal 
w
*
= ),(* λβw , *b =∆/2, p*=β* *w , c*=λ*b*, and the profit of each party and the total 
supply chain. The intermediate solution for the case of r(c)=1 is given in Appendix I. 
Expression (6) is a bivariate optimization problem, we could find the optimal solution 
of Expression (6) by first solving the first order necessary condition (FONC), {∂∏R/∂β=0, 
∂∏R/∂λ=0} (see Appendix II for the difficulty of obtaining a closed-form solution from 
FONC). We can check if the FONC satisfying point is optimal by checking the second 
order sufficient condition (SOSC) evaluated at such a point, that is, checking the Hessian 
Matrix of ∏R(β, λ), H= 11 12
21 22
h h
h h
 
 
 
= 
 
 To meet the SOSC, we should have 
     (C1) 
It can be easily verified that Condition (C1) holds.  
Also, to meet SOSC, we should have h11*h22-h12*h21>0, i.e., 
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 (C2) 
A sufficient condition to guarantee that there exists a unique optimal solution to the 
Max ∏R(β,λ) problem of Expression (6) is that Condition (C2) is met in the region of 
interest defined as [ , ]L Uβ β β∈ and [ , ]L Uλ λ λ∈ , and hence ∏R(β,λ) is concave in the 
region. [ , ]L Uβ β  and [ , ]L Uλ λ are meaningful and practical ranges of β and λ, and could 
be obtained from real economic data.  
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CHAPTER 4. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
Even when Condition (C2) in Chapter 3 does not hold, we observe that a unique 
equilibrium may exist in numerous cases. For such cases, in this chapter, we present the 
numerical analysis of the retailer-driven model with linear function forms. 
Section 4.1 gives a numerical example with a set of parameter values. Based on the 
numerical example, we then discuss the optimal λ in the supply chain, the meaning, and 
the relationship to the loss leader pricing policy. Section 4.2 presents extensive numerical 
examples and sensitivity analysis.  
 
4.1 A Numerical Example and Optimal λ 
We first consider a numerical example with u=1000, v=20, cm=5, k=0.5 and ∆=1 to 
introduce the findings of the model. The graph of the retailer’s profit vs. β and λ 
(Expression (6)) is shown in the Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Retailer’s Profit in Retailer-driven Model 
 
In Figure 3, the retailer’s profit function has one global optimal point at (β=3.953, 
λ=1.406, 4.7957=Π R ), and one saddle point at (β=20, λ=20, 0=Π R ). ∏R(β, λ) is 
concave around the global point (β=3.953,λ=1.406).  
We note that in the retailer-driven model with forward flow only (see Appendix XI) 
with the same parameter values, we find the optimal β=3.858 and the retailer’s profit is 
RΠ =7881.71. The retailer-driven remanufacturing model gives more profit for the retailer 
and larger forward flow price multiplier.  
One interesting point from the numerical example is that λ*>1, which is quite 
counter-intuitive. To understand the meaning of λ*>1, we need to consider that to achieve 
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her profit maximization, the retailer has three possibilities: 
(i) Profit from forward flow only, and may lose profit in reverse flow (β>1, λ≥1).  
(ii) Profit from reverse flow only, and may lose profit in forward flow (β≤1, λ<1).  
(iii) Profit from both forward flow and reverse flow (β>1, λ<1).  
The numerical example in Figure 3 shows that the retailer not only gives up the profit 
from the reverse flow, but also incurs loss in the reverse flow to achieve the maximal 
profit from the forward flow by setting β>1, λ>1 (when the return rate r(c) is less than 1). 
λ*>1 seems to imply that by incurring loss in the reverse flow, the retailer helps the 
manufacturer to collect more used product and lower the unit production cost 
(cm(1-r(c))+cr r(c)). The lowered unit production cost enables the manufacturer charge 
less wholesale price w, which compensates the retailer’s loss in the reverse flow. In this 
way, the retailer’s profit can be maximized.  
This phenomenon is very similar to the loss leader pricing policy used by many 
retailer stores to attract customers by setting very low prices, sometimes below cost, for 
some products and hoping the customers will buy other products to make up the loss and 
also make enough profit. We define “strong loss leader pricing” as the pricing strategy in 
which the undertaker incurs strict loss for the product, and “weak loss leader pricing” as 
the pricing strategy in which no profit is made or loss is incurred. In this example of the 
retailer-driven model, we observe that the retailer, the Stackelberg leader in the supply 
chain, adopts the strong loss leader pricing policy to the reverse flow. 
A question about this loss leader pricing phenomenon is how often we could expect it. 
We conduct extensive numerical examples in section 4.2 to show that λ>1 is prevailing.  
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4.2 Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we conduct extensive numerical examples to show how prevailing the 
loss leader pricing phenomenon could be observed with various parameter values.  
The numerical example in section 4.1 uses the following parameter values u=1000, 
v=20, cm=5, k=0.5 and ∆=1. Among all the parameters, we believe that the direct savings 
from remanufacturing (∆) and the marginal return rate (k) are the most influential in the 
reverse flow, because ∆ reflects the potential savings of the reverse flow for the supply 
chain and k reflects the customers’ willingness to return products. The slope of the 
demand function (v) is also important because it affects the demand in the forward flow. 
In our numerical examples, first we study the effect of the different combination of k 
values (from k=0.05 to 1.6) and ∆ values (∆=1,2,3) on the retailer-driven supply chain, 
especially on λ. The details of the numerical examples could be found in Appendix V. 
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Figure 4. Optimal λ vs. k and ∆ in Retailer-driven Model 
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Figure 5. Return Rate r(c) vs. k and ∆ in Retailer-driven Model 
 
We first look at the reverse flow price multiplier λ (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). We 
observe that each curve in Figure 4 first increases slowly and then decreases sharply in k. 
The turning point of the two segments of each curve is when the return rate r(c) hits 1, i.e., 
when r(c) <1, λ is increasing in k and when r(c)=1, λ is decreasing in k.  
 k represents the customers’ willingness to return products. As k increases, the retailer 
reacts to collecting more used products by setting a slightly higher λ and λ >1 (this is the 
loss leader pricing policy); the process continues until the return rate hits 1, and then the 
retailer starts to decrease λ because a high λ is not necessary when the return rate hits 1. 
The optimal λ when return rate r(c)=1 is λ*=2/(∆k) and follows a different pricing 
mechanism from loss leader pricing (see Appendix I). 
 What we observe from the above is that the loss leader pricing phenomenon is 
prevailing in the retailer’s pricing strategy with different k and ∆ values for the cases of 
r(c)<1. The second interesting observation is that the optimal λ in the retailer-driven 
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model is very insensitive to the k and ∆ values, as we can see in Figure 4, λ* is around 1.4 
for the cases of r(c)<1, regardless of the fact that k changes from 0.05 to 1.6 and ∆ 
changes from 1 to 3. (The discussion of the sensitivity of the forward price multiplier β 
with respect to k and ∆ could be found in Appendix V).  
We continue our numerical examples to study another important parameter v, the 
slope of the demand function, and its impact on the optimal λ of the retailer-driven model. 
We use the parameter values u=1000, cm=5, k=0.15 and ∆=2, and vary v from 5 to 199. 
Because p ≥ cm, and for a positive D(p)=u-vp exists, v has be v ≤ u/cm=200. See Figure 6 
for the optimal λ vs. v in the retailer-driven model for this example (see Appendix V for 
detailed data of the numerical examples).  
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Figure 6. Optimal λ vs. v in Retailer-driven Model 
 
From Figure 6, we observe that (1) the λ is always greater than 1 in all the feasible 
range of v, which confirms that the loss leader pricing is prevailing; and (2) the optimal λ 
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is more sensitive to v compared to k or ∆. The observation seems to suggest that the 
forward flow is more important to the retailer in terms of profitability and thus the retailer 
would adopt a loss leader pricing policy to the reverse flow.  
Based on the numerical examples, we summarize the key findings of the 
retailer-driven model in the following observation.  
 
OBSERVATION 1. The retailer (Stackelberg leader) in the two-echelon 
retailer-driven closed-loop supply chain with product remanufacturing gives up the 
profit from reverse flow and makes profit from the forward flow only, by setting the 
optimal price multiple λ*>1. The optimal λ* is sensitive to the slope of the demand 
function (v), but insensitive to the direct savings from remanufacturing (∆) or the 
marginal return rate (k).  
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CHAPTER 5. OPTIMALITY ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we provide an observation on λ via a limited optimality analysis of 
the retailer-driven model at λ=1. That is, for this chapter, we do not assume the concavity 
of the retailer’s objective function everywhere. The purpose of the chapter is to help gain 
an intuitive explanation of the optimal λ* being λ*>1 with the help of a Retailer-driven 
Manufacturer-collecting Model.  
 
5.1 Optimality Analysis at λ=1 
The basic retailer-driven model has a special case when λ=1 (as shown in the upper 
section of Figure 7), which is mathematically equivalent to the Retailer-driven 
Manufacturer-collecting Model (as shown in the lower section of Figure 7).  
 
 
In the Retailer-driven Manufacturer-collecting (RDMC) Model, the manufacturer 
collects the used product directly from the customers; and the retailer only operates in the 
Manufacturer Retailer 
D(p) 
r(c) b 
w 
c=λb, λ=1 
p=βw 
Forward Flow 
Reverse Flow 
Figure 7. Retailer-driven Manufacturer-collecting (RDMC) Model 
cm  cr 
Customers 
Manufacturer Retailer 
D(p) 
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w 
p=βw 
Forward Flow 
Reverse Flow 
cm  cr 
Customers 
RDMC model 
Basic model with λ=1 
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forward flow, by declaring the forward flow price multiplier β. We use the notation 
)(RRDMC βΠ  to represent the profit of the retailer as a function of the sole decision 
variable β in the RDMC model. The retailer is still the Stackelberg leader and all other 
assumptions are still true in the RDMC model. This situation is equivalent in terms of 
prices and profits to our basic retailer-driven (retailer-collecting) model with λ=1.  
Assume that (β=β2 >1) is the optimal solution of the RDMC model, obviously this 
solution is equivalent to the point (β=β2,λ=1) in the basic retailer-driven 
(retailer-collecting) model, as shown in the Figure 8 point B.  
We also assume that 0k - cm 4 2 >∆ (which is a reasonable assumption for practical 
parameter values because k is usually a small number) and Let β1=
 )k - cm 4 ( v
u2
2∆
, we 
could show that 0),(
)1,( 1
=
∂
Π∂
== λββλ
λβR
 and 0),(
)1,( 1
>
∂
Π∂
=> λββλ
λβR
 (see appendix 
III for proof). This means that if we use gradient-based optimization at any point (β>β1, 
λ=1) as shown in the bold dashed line in Figure 8, the next step is pointing to somewhere 
λ>1.  
Moreover, we could show that β2>β1 (see appendix IV for proof) when 
0k - cm 4 2 >∆  and )k - cm v(4u 2∆>  (both inequalities are reasonable assumptions for 
practical parameter values because k is usually a small number, and u is usually a big 
number.) This in turn means 0),(
)1,( 2
>
∂
Π∂
== λββλ
λβR
.  
We also know that 0),(
)1,( 2
=
∂
Π∂
== λβββ
λβR
 because (β=β2,λ=1) is the optimal 
solution of the RDMC model.  
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Considering the above, we conclude that the gradient of the function ),( λβRΠ at the 
point (β=β2,λ=1) is ),(),( λβλβ RΠ∇ = (0, 0),(
)1,( 2
>
∂
Π∂
== λββλ
λβR ). Figure 8 shows the 
gradients, β1, β2and the actual global optimum of the numerical example used in section 
4.1. 
 
 
 
The above analysis is interesting, because from the optimization point of view, if 
using some gradient-based search method and starting at point B (the optimal solution of 
RDMC model), even though we don’t know where the search converges, the initial move 
is to somewhere (β=β2,λ >1).  
Intuitively, we could image that when the supply chain moving from the RDMC 
model to our basic retailer-driven (retailer-collecting) model, as the retailer gains more 
control (mathematically from fixed λ=1 to a unconstrained λ), the initial move of the 
retailer is to keep the forward flow pricing strategy β intact (because 
λ=1 
λ 
β β2 =3.92 β1=3.20 
),(),( λβλβ RΠ∇  
B (RDMC solution) A 
Figure 8. Optimality Analysis at λ=1 (u=1000, v=20, cm=5, k=0.5 and ∆=1) 
. 
global optimum 
(β* =3.95,λ*=1.406) 
  
30 
0),(
)1,( 2
=
∂
Π∂
== λβββ
λβR ); while at the same time to set the reverse flow pricing strategy 
as λ >1, which is exactly the loss leader pricing phenomenon we observe, i.e., the retailer 
adopts loss leader pricing policy to the reverse flow.  
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CHAPTER 6. CENTRALLY COORDINATED AND MANUFACTURER-DRIVEN 
MODELS 
The centrally coordinated and manufacturer-driven supply chain with product 
remanufacturing has been studied in a few literatures. Among other, Savaskan (2004) 
studies such models with the assumption that the total cost of collecting the used product 
is )()()( 2 pDAτCpDAIτC L ττ +=+= , where I is the marketing investment, τ  is the 
return rate, A is the constant variable unit cost paid to the customers for returning a used 
product, LC  is a scaling parameter, and D(p) is the demand. In their model, the return 
rate is a result of the marketing investment I, i.e., I/C=τ  and the variable unit cost 
(A) paid for returning a used product is not a decision variable.  
We take a different approach to model the centrally coordinated and 
manufacturer-driven models with the assumption that the return rate, r(c), is a direct result 
of the incentive paid (c).  
In this chapter, section 6.1 presents the model description of the centrally coordinated 
and the manufacturer-driven model. We then analyze the centrally coordinated model in 
section 6.2 and the manufacturer-driven model in section 6.3, which is followed by the 
optimality analysis of the solution of the manufacturer-driven model in Section 6.4. 
Section 6.5 gives the result of the linear models.  
 
6.1 Model Description 
We only give a brief description of the centrally coordinated and manufacturer-driven 
model below, because the two models have been studied in a few literature (even through 
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with different assumption).  
See Figure 9 for the three models: centrally coordinated model, manufacturer-driven 
model and retailer-driven model (to provide a comparison here). In this paper, we also 
refer the three models as three scenarios: Scenario C, Scenario M, and Scenario R to 
make reference easy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Scenario C, the manufacturer and the retailer, considered as a whole system, 
jointly determine the optimal prices p and c to maximize the total supply chain profit. The 
prices w and b do not affect the total supply chain profit because they are within the 
system; but they affect how the total profit is divided between the manufacturer and the 
retailer. In the later of the paper, we also discuss some coordination mechanisms to 
implement the centrally coordinated supply chain. Scenario C serves as the benchmark in 
our research to highlight the inefficiency of the other two scenarios.  
Manufacturer 
Retailer 
w 
p 
b 
c 
D(p) r(c) 
Scenario C 
Manufacturer 
Retailer 
w 
p(w,b) 
b 
c(w,b) 
D(p) r(c) 
Scenario M 
Manufacturer 
Retailer 
w(β,λ) 
p=wβ 
b(β,λ) 
c=bλ 
D(p) r(c) 
Scenario R 
β λ 
Figure 9. Three Scenarios of the Supply Chain Power  
  
33 
Scenario M and Scenario R represent two cases where dominant supply chain power 
exists in the supply chain. We assume that no coordination exists in Scenario M and 
Scenario R.  
In Scenario M, the manufacturer has sufficient supply chain power over the retailer to 
act as a Stackelberg leader. The manufacturer can predict the retailer’s reaction (setting of 
prices p and c) given his action (setting of w and b). By taking into account the retailer’s 
reaction the manufacturer tries to obtain his maximal profit. 
We have discussed Scenario R (retailer-driven channel) in details in Chapter 3 and 4.  
We note that in Scenario R, the price multiplier β has a special meaning in the 
economics literature, i.e., the sensitivity of the retail price to the wholesale price 
(β=∂p/∂w). For example, in the classic bilateral monopoly model, the sensitivity β is 
always 1/2 (see Tirole, 1988; Varian, 1992). Accordingly, the price multiplier λ (λ=∂c/∂b) 
can be interpreted as the sensitivity of the collecting price to the return price. While in 
Scenario M the Stackelberg leader (the manufacturer) first directly determining the prices 
and thus indirectly determines the sensitivities; in Scenario R the Stackelberg (the retailer) 
directly determines the sensitivities, which in turn indirectly determine the prices. In this 
way, Scenario M and Scenario R are unified in the same framework of optimal pricing 
decision. 
In this chapter, we use general function form of D(p) and r(c) for analysis. We 
assume that D(p)>0, D’(p)<0 and D"(p)  exists; r(0)=0, 10 ≤≤ r(c) , r’(c)>0 and r"(c)  
exists. For numerical examples, we use linear D(p) and r(c). We also note that 
conventional FONC’s and SOSC’s can be easily derived as in Chapter 3.  
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In the rest of the dissertation, we will use subscripts C, M, R of a variable to 
represent the three scenarios, e.g., Mb  is the return price in Scenario M. 
 
6.2 Centrally Coordinated Supply Chain 
In centrally coordinated supply chain (Scenario C), the manufacturer and the retailer 
jointly maximize the total supply chain profit )])(()[( ccrcmppDT −∆+−=Π  over p 
and c. We can find that optimal collecting price *Cc  is independent on p, because for any 
given p the *Cc  is always 
)(Max  arg* cr(c)c
c
C −∆=        (4) 
The first order necessary condition (FONC) and the second order sufficient condition 
(SOSC) at *Cc  are r′(c)(∆-c)-r(c)=0 and r″(c)(∆-c)-2 r′(c)<0 respectively. We assume that 
SOSC is satisfied and the single global optimum is obtained at *Cc . Once obtaining the 
optimal *Cc , the optimal retail price 
*
Cp  can be obtained in a similar way, i.e., by 
optimizing a univariate problem over p. 
)])(()[(Max  arg *** CC
p
C ccrcmppDp −∆+−=      (5) 
We also assume that the SOSC at *Cp , 0)("]))(([)('2 ** <+−−∆+ pDpcmccrpD CC  
is satisfied and the single global optimum is obtained at *Cp .  
As a result of the above assumptions and the specific structure of the objective 
function, we can conclude that the supply chain profit will be maximized at the single 
point (p= *Cp , c= *Cc ).  
 
6.3 Manufacturer-driven Supply Chain 
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In the manufacturer-driven supply chain (Scenario M), the manufacturer acts as the 
Stackelberg leader. The retailer maximizes ∏R over p and c for a given pair of w and b. 
Because the manufacturer knows exactly the retailer’s reaction functions, i.e., optimal 
retail price p*(w,b) and optimal collecting price c*(w,b); By taking into account these 
reaction functions, the manufacturer maximizes ∏M over w and b. We present the key 
findings of Scenario M under general function form as follows.  
 
PROPOSITION 1. In Scenario M (Manufacturer-driven model), to achieve his profit 
maximization, the manufacturer sets the optimal return price *Mb =∆=cm-cr, i.e., he 
profits from the forward flow only by adopting weak loss leader pricing policy to the 
reverse flow.  
Proof. See Appendix VI for a proof using implicit function theory. ■ 
 
Similar to the retailer in the retailer-driven model, the manufacturer in the 
manufacturer-driven model has three possibilities to achieve his profit maximization: 
(i)  Profit from forward flow only (w>cm, b≥∆).  
(ii) Profit from reverse flow only (w≤cm, b<∆).  
(iii) Profit from both forward flow and reverse flow (w>cm, b<∆).  
Proposition 1 shows that when the manufacturer has dominant supply chain power, 
he should adopt the weak loss leader pricing policy to the reverse, similar to what the 
retailer does in the retailer-driven model, i.e, by giving up the cost savings from the 
reverse flow (∆) to obtain the maximal profit from the forward flow only.  
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This is interesting because we observe that in both retailer-driven and 
manufacturer-driven model, the Stackelberg leader adopts the loss leader pricing policy to 
the reverse flow, which apparently highlights the relative importance in terms of 
profitability of the forward flow and the reverse flow.  
We note that Savaskan et al. (2004) has the same observation (i.e., *Mb =∆) under the 
assumption of a linear demand function and a specific collecting function, i.e., 
)()()( 2 pDAτCpDAIτC L ττ +=+= . Proposition 1 gives the conclusion in a more 
general form.  
There seems to be a driving force behind this phenomenon. The manufacturer gives 
up all the savings from the reverse flow by setting b=∆. On the other hand, by setting 
b=∆, the retailer is given more incentive to collect the used product. Since the total 
returned product is D(p)r(c), the retailer can decrease retail price p (D′(p)<0) or increase 
collecting price c (r′(c)>0) or do both to collect more. It appears that by setting b=∆, the 
manufacturer triggers the decrease in p (and thus the increase in demand D(p)), which in 
turn compensates the manufacturer’s loss (or having no profit) in the reverse flow and it 
proves to be the optimal solution for the manufacturer in Scenario M. We illustrate this 
process by graphs using the linear demand function and linear return rate function in the 
next section 6.4.  
As a comparison to the optimal *Mb =∆ in the manufacturer-driven model, an 
interesting finding about the optimal *Rb  in the retailer-driven model is that the 
manufacturer sets the optimal return price *Rb <∆=cm-cr, i.e, he should retain part of the 
direct savings from remanufacturing (see Appendix VII for proof). The implication is that 
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when the manufacturer loses the leader position in the supply chain, he should not give up 
profit from the reverse flow. The reason is as follows. In Scenario M, considering the 
retailer’s reaction functions, the manufacturer’s profit is 
)]))((())[,(( bbcrcmwbwpDMM −∆+−=Π , where the retail price p is a function of w and 
b, and the collecting price c is a function of b (See Appendix VI). By observing MMΠ , we 
can see that the demand could be changed by changing b, and that is the basis for the 
manufacturer’s deliberate forfeit of profit in the reverse flow. However in Scenario R, 
given the retailer’s announcement of β and λ, the manufacturer’s profit is 
)])(()[( bbrcmwwDMR −∆+−=Π λβ . By observing MRΠ , we can see b has no effect on 
the demand by the customers, which means that there is no reason to give up the profit in 
the reverse flow. Therefore, the supply chain power structure determines the 
manufacturer’s decision of the return price. 
The discussion regarding other optimal prices (p*,w*,b*) and profits in Scenario M 
could be found in Appendix VIII.  
 
6.4 Optimality Analysis of *Mb =∆ in Scenario M with the linear function forms 
This section shows the features around the optimal point *Mb =∆ in Scenario M with 
the linear function forms, i.e., the features of the model when b= ε±*Mb (ε is a small 
positive real number). This section partially explains the underling reason why the 
manufacturer gives up all the directing savings ∆ from the reverse flow (for the case 
r(c)<1 ). 
The optimal solution of the manufacturer’s profit is ( *Mb , *Mw ), but our focus is only 
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the return price b and our approach is to study the path from (b , )(* bw ) to ( *Mb , *Mw ), 
where b= ε±*Mb and )(* bw is optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer given the 
return price b.  
Following the procedure described in Appendix VI and assuming the case r(c)<1, we 
first obtain the retailer’s reaction functions p*(w,b) and c*(b), then replace these reaction 
functions into the manufacturer’s profit MΠ . We can get MΠ as a function of w and b, 
i.e.,  
16/)44))(2()(2(),( 2 vwkvbukbcmcrbkbwbwM −+−++−=Π  
To obtain )(* bw , we solve 0/),( =∂Π∂ wbwM  and get  
8/)23(2/)2/()( 2* ∆−++= kbkbcmvubw  
We can then find the manufacturer’s profit as a function of b: 
)256/()))2(4(4()),(()( 2* vbkbcmvubbwb MM ∆−+−=Π=Π  
and the retail price as a function of b: 
p*(b)=p*( )(* bw ,b)= )16/()))2(4(12()),(()( * vbkbcmvubbwb MM ∆−++=Π=Π  
To further study the effect of b on the forward flow and the reverse flow, we calculated 
the manufacturer profit from the forward flow as  
)128/()))23(4(4)))(2(4(4())())((()( ** vbkbcmvubkbcmvucmbwbvpubFM ∆−−−∆−+−=−−=Π
and the manufacturer’s profit from the reverse flow as  
32/)()))2(4(4())())((()( * bkbbkbcmvubkcbvpubMR −∆∆−+−=−∆−=Π  
A graphic illustration of the relationships among )(bMΠ , )(bFMΠ , )(bRMΠ  and p*(b) 
around the optimal point *Mb =∆ is shown in Figure 10. We can see that the total profit is 
maximized at b=∆, while the retail price is maximized at the same point b=∆ (which 
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means the demand is maximized at b=∆). The forward flow profit )(bFMΠ is increasing 
and the reverse flow profit )(bRMΠ is decreasing around *Mb =∆; but the abstract value of 
the slope of )(bFMΠ  is greater than that of )(bRMΠ when b<∆, and vice verse when 
b>∆.  
The relationships partially explain the underlying reason why the manufacturer gives 
up ∆ from the reverse flow. When b increases to ∆ from a point b<∆, the retail price 
decreases and the demand increases. The increased demand benefits the manufacturer in 
the forward flow. Although the profit from the reverse flow decreases, the total profit 
increases. A similar analysis can be done when b>∆. 
 
Figure 10. Optimality Analysis at *Mb =∆  (u=1000, v=20, cm=5, ∆=1, k=0.5.) 
 
6.5 Linear model - Scenario C and Scenario M with the linear function forms 
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In this section, we briefly give the result of the solution of Scenario C and Scenario 
M with the linear demand and return rate function forms. Following a similar solution 
procedure (see Appendix VI), we can find the closed-form solutions of the prices and the 
profits in the supply chain for Scenario C and Scenario M with the linear function forms 
(see Table 2). To further compare our model with the traditional model with only forward 
flow, we also include in Table 2 the corresponding solutions of the traditional model. 
 
Table 2. Linear Model Results (Scenario M and Scenario C) 
Scenario M (our model) Scenario C (our model) 
 
If k/12/ <∆  
(Unbound 
solutions) 
If k/12/ ≥∆  
(Bounded 
solutions) 
If 
k/12/ <∆  
(Unbound 
solutions) 
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k/12/ ≥∆  
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Notice from Table 2 that depending on whether k/12/ <∆  or not, the optimal 
solution is drawn from one set of two solutions for Scenario M and Scenario C in our 
model (one is unbound by c≤1/k or r(c) ≤1, the other is bounded by c≤1/k or r(c) ≤1). We 
summarize some interesting findings of Scenario C and Scenario M of the linear model as 
follows. 
[1] Our model is a generalization of the traditional forward-only model. Specifically 
when remanufacturing is impossible (k=0 or ∆=0), our model is degenerated into the 
traditional forward-only model. 
[2] When k/12/ <∆ , the optimal return rate is less than 1; when k/12/ ≥∆ , the 
optimal return rate is 1. 
[3] In Scenario M of our model, when the return rate is less than 1 ( k/12/ <∆ ), the 
optimal return price is *Mb =∆ (Proposition 1) and the optimal collecting price is 
*
Mc =∆/2. 
[4] When the optimal return rate is 1 (i.e., when k/12/ ≥∆ ), the manufacturer can 
retain part of the direct savings from remanufacturing in Scenario M, i.e., ε+= kbM /2*  
could be less than ∆ (This is different from Proposition 1 and caused by the 
indifferentiability of r(c) at the point c=1/k). The term ε  in *Mb  and *Mw  in Scenario 
M means that when all the products will be returned (i.e., r(c)=1), only the difference 
between *Mw  and *Mb  affects the manufacturer’s profit, not the exact values. 
[5] 3/ 2 2 TΠ=Π=Π RM  in Scenario M of both our model and traditional model. 
[6] In both our model and the traditional model, the total supply chain profit T Π  of 
Scenario M shrinks 25% compared to that of Scenario C. Since both models show the 
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same percentage of shrinkage of the total profit, we can conclude that the shrinkage is 
caused entirely by the forward flow in Scenario M, i.e., the reverse flow in Scenario M 
causes no inefficiency. 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION OF THE MODELS 
In this chapter, we present some discussion about the three models (retailer-driven, 
manufacturer-driven and centrally coordinated), which includes the comparison of the 
three models in section 7.1, the supply chain coordination issues in section 7.2, the policy 
implication of the models in section 7.3, and a third party collecting model in section 7.4.  
 
7.1 Comparison of the Models 
First we use a simple numerical example with parameter values (u=1000, v=20, cm=5, 
cr=4, k=0.5) to illustrate the comparison of the models with linear function forms.  For 
Scenario C and Scenario M, we use Table 2 to compute the prices and the profit. For 
Scenario R, we can find the solution using the methods in Chapter 3. 
For the three scenarios, we also calculate an index called “Efficiency” (Efficiency = 
Total supply chain profit of the scenario / Total supply chain profit of Scenario C) to 
reflect the total supply chain profit as a percentage of the maximal achievable profit of the 
supply chain. The results are in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Numerical Comparison of the Three Scenarios 
 
*w  
*p  *β  *b  *c  *λ  *c / *p  
MΠ  RΠ  TΠ  Efficiency* 
C  27.44   0.5  0.018   10181.33 100% 
M 27.56 38.72 1.41 1 0.5 0.5 0.012 5090.66 2545.33 7635.99 75% 
R 8.74 34.55 3.95 0.5 0.70 1.41 0.020 1210.3 7957.4 9167.7 90.04% 
*Efficiency = Total supply chain profit of the scenario / Total supply chain profit of 
Scenario C 
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From Table 3, we can notice that the supply chain power has great influence on the 
profit of each party in the supply chain. We observe that the majority of the profit is 
obtained by the Stackelberg leader; and that the leader in Scenario R (the retailer) extracts 
relatively more profit than the leader in Scenario M (the manufacturer).  
 Regarding the reverse flow in the supply chain, in Scenario M we observe that the 
manufacturer (the leader) gives up all the direct savings from remanufacturing in the 
reverse flow (by setting 1* =−= crcmbM  as stated in Proposition 1) and profits from the 
forward flow only. In Scenario R, we observe that the retailer (the leader) not only gives 
up the profit from the reverse flow, but also actually incurs net loss from the reverse flow 
by setting 1406.1* >=Rλ , i.e., by setting the collecting price *Rc  greater than the return 
price *Rb  (as stated in Observation 1).  This is the loss leader pricing policy used by the 
Stackelberg leader in the supply chain.  
Another interesting observation from the numerical example is that the overall supply 
chain of Scenario R is much more efficient than that of Scenario M (90.04% Efficiency of 
Scenario R vs. 75% Efficiency of Scenario M; also notice that the Efficiency of Scenario 
M is always 75%, see Table 2). The underlying reason appears to be the retailer’s 
closeness or direct influence over the customers (i.e., the decision of the retail price p and 
the collecting price c has direct influence over the demand and return rate). When the 
retailer has supply chain power and the advantage of direct influence over market, the 
system efficiency is much higher than the situation when the manufacturer has supply 
chain power and the disadvantage of indirect influence over the market. This advantage of 
the retailer because of being closer to the customers has been reported for a different 
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setting in a few literatures (e.g., Savaskan 2004 shows that retailer is the most effective 
undertaker of product collection activity because of being closer to the customers).  
 We then compare the supply chain performance in Scenario M and Scenario R. 
Regarding the supply chain efficiency in Scenario M, we know from Table 2 that 
Efficiency= %75/ =ΠΠ TCTM ; In Scenario R, the efficiency in the numerical examples 
with different parameter values is listed in Table 4. We observe that the total supply chain 
of Scenario R is much more efficient than that of Scenario M (average 90.6% Efficiency 
of Scenario R vs. 75% Efficiency of Scenario M). We also observe that the efficiency of 
Scenario R is increasing in k and in ∆), i.e., as the savings from remanufacturing ∆ 
increases or the customers become more willing to return products (k becomes larger), the 
supply chain in Scenario R is more efficient (c.f., the Efficiency of Scenario M is always 
75%).  
 
Table 4. Supply Chain Efficiency in Scenario R 
Efficiency k=0.1 k=0.3 k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 
∆=3 90.15% 90.64% 91.34% 91.40% 91.25% 91.18% 91.13% 
∆=2 90.02% 90.23% 90.45% 91.01% 90.86% 90.79% 90.74% 
∆=1 89.94% 89.99% 90.05% 90.18% 90.35% 90.44% 90.40% 
  
Last, we look at the percentage of the total supply chain profit extracted by the 
Stackelberg leader in each scenario. In Scenario M, we know that 3/ 2 2 TΠ=Π=Π RM  
from Table 2, or the manufacturer (the leader) extracts 66.7% of the total supply chain 
profit. In Scenario R, the percentage of the total supply chain profit that the retailer (the 
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leader) obtains in the numerical examples with different parameter values is listed in 
Table 5. We observe that the retailer in Scenario R extracts relatively more than the 
manufacturer in Scenario M (average 87.6% in Scenario R vs. 66.7% in Scenario M). 
Considering both the supply chain efficiency and the percentage of each party, we can 
conclude that under the same circumstance the retailer in Scenario R can make much 
more profit than the manufacturer in Scenario M. 
 
Table 5. The Retailer (the Stackelberg Leader) Profit Percentage in Scenario R 
Retailer 
Profit % 
k=0.1 k=0.3 k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 
∆=3 86.98% 87.88% 88.65% 88.60% 88.59% 88.58% 88.57% 
∆=2 86.75% 87.12% 87.51% 87.89% 87.88% 87.87% 87.86% 
∆=1 86.62% 86.71% 86.80% 87.03% 87.22% 87.21% 87.21% 
 
7.2 Supply Chain Coordination 
In the above analysis, we assume that the centrally coordinated supply chain is 
automatically achieved. However, unless the manufacturer and the retailer are of the same 
company or vertically integrated so that the total supply chain profit is the objective, the 
manufacturer and the retailer could not achieve the coordination automatically. Usually 
the Stackelberg leader, because of the dominant supply chain power, could initiate a 
coordination mechanism so that both parties could get better or at least not worse profit 
than in the uncoordinated supply chain. In this section, we give a description of the 
possible coordination mechanism available to the Stackelberg leader in the supply chain. 
We present the analysis as follows.  
  
47 
First, in the retailer-driven supply chain (Scenario R), the retailer’s price multipliers β 
and λ at (β=1, λ=1) have a special meaning in Scenario R. When the retail sets (β=1, 
λ=1), the retailer’s price will be ∏R=D(p)[p-w+r(c)(b-c)]= D(wβ)[ wβ-w+r(bλ)(b- bλ)]=0; 
the manufacturer’s profit will be ∏M=D(p)[w-cm+r(c)(∆-b)]= D(w)[w-cm+r(b)(∆-b)]. To 
maximize this manufacturer’s profit ∏M over w and b is equivalent to maximizing the 
total supply chain profit ∏T over p and c in Scenario C, and we will get (p=w= *Cp , 
b=c= *Cc ). Therefore, (β=1, λ=1) is a sufficient condition for ∏T maximization in Scenario 
R. Because of the specific structure of the objection function, (β=1, λ=1) is also a 
necessary condition for ∏T maximization in Scenario R (Proof see Appendix X).  
In  the manufacturer-driven supply chain (Scenario M), the manufacturer’s prices w 
and b at (w=cm, b=∆) have a special meaning. When the manufacturer sets (w=cm, b=∆), 
i.e., when the manufacturer’s profit ∏M=D(p)[w-cm+r(c)(∆-b)]=0, the retailer’s profit is 
∏R=D(p)[p-w+r(c)(b-c)] =D(p)[p-cm+r(c)(∆-c)]. To maximize this retailer’s profit ∏R 
over p and c is equivalent to maximizing the total supply chain profit ∏T over p and c in 
Scenario C, and we will get (p= *Cp , c= *Cc ). Therefore, (w=cm, b=∆) is a sufficient 
condition for ∏T maximization in Scenario M. Because of the specific structure of the 
objection function, (w=cm, b=∆) is also a necessary condition for ∏T maximization in 
Scenario M (Proof see Appendix IX). 
Based on the above discussion, we briefly discuss the coordination mechanism for 
the supply chain in Scenario M and Scenario R. Specially, we assume that the retailer will 
initiate in Scenario R and the manufacturer will initiate the coordination in Scenario M 
because of the Stackelberg leader position.  
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In Scenario R, the two parties can adopt any of the following two effective 
coordination mechanisms: 
(R1) The retailer sets (β=1, λ=1) and the manufacturer pays a fixed payment to shift 
a part of the total supply chain profit to the retailer. In this way, the retailer acts a selling 
and collecting agent and is compensated by a fixed lump sum payment.  
(R2) The manufacturer and the retailer have an implicit understanding (see Jeuland 
and Shugan, 1983) about the setting of p and c to *Cp  and *Cc  to achieve maximal total 
supply chain profit. The retailer then set β>1 or λ<1 and require the wholesale price 
w= *Cp /β or b= *Cc /λ from the manufacturer.  
Similarly, in Scenario M, the two parties can adopt any of the following two effective 
coordination mechanisms: 
(M1) The manufacturer sets (w=cm, b=∆) and the retailer pays a fixed payment to 
shift a part of the total supply chain profit to the manufacturer. In this way, the 
manufacturer acts a manufacturing and remanufacturing agent and is compensated by a 
fixed lump sum payment. 
(M2) The manufacturer and the retailer have an implicit understanding (see Jeuland 
and Shugan, 1983) about the setting of p and c to *Cp  and *Cc  to achieve maximal total 
supply chain profit. The manufacturer then sets w>cm or b<∆ to obtain a part of the total 
supply chain profit while leaving the remaining to the retailer. 
The exact amount of the fixed payment in (R1) or (M1) and the exact values of β and 
λ in (R2) or the exact prices w and b in (M2) are an important negotiation issue in 
coordination. The determination of these values introduces the quantitative measure of the 
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supply chain power, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, what remains 
always true is that the retail price p and the collecting price c will be set to the optimal 
point (p= *Cp , c= *Cc ), which is the link between the retailer-driven or manufacturer-driven 
model to the centrally coordinated model. We also note that the coordination mechanism 
is subject to the pricing laws that may affect the implementation of these coordination 
mechanisms.  
 
7.3 Policy Implications of the Models 
Based on the analysis and numerical examples above, we summarize the price 
decision in the three scenarios in the following Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Comparison of Three Scenarios 
 From Analysis                From Numerical Example 
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Besides the many managerial insights discussed in above sections, the most 
interesting implication for decision makers is that the retailer-driven supply chain results 
in higher return rate of used product than the manufacturer-driven supply chain and the 
centrally coordinated supply chain ( from *** RMC ccc <=  and thus 
)()()( *** RMC crcrcr <=  ). This means that if the remanufacturing (because of 
environmental concerns) is of paramount importance, the retailer-driven supply chain 
may be the most recommended situation, even better than the centrally coordinated 
supply chain. Decision/policy support for community may prefer to attract Retailer-driven 
over Manufacturer-driven or Centrally Coordinated supply chain with subsidies, tax 
reduction, etc. However, the concrete steps to achieve these policy decisions need further 
study. 
 Another interesting implication is that from the consumer’s point of view, the 
centrally coordinated supply chain could generate the largest consumer surplus, 
because *** MRC ppp << , i.e., the consumers would prefer the centrally coordinated supply 
chain to the other two alternatives. Policy makers who seek maximal consumer surplus 
would recommend the manufacturer and the retailer to coordinate in the supply chain.  
 
7.4 Third Party Collecting Model 
The retailer-driven and the manufacturer-driven model discussed above are basic 
models. More complicated supply chain models with different supply chain structure 
could be developed based on these basic models.  
As one simple example, in this section, we introduce a third party as the collecting 
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agent in the supply chain. Savaskan (2004) discusses a steady state supply chain model 
where the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and a 3rd party collects the used product 
(see Figure 11). Under their assumptions about the collecting cost and return rate ( i.e., 
)()()( 2 pDAτCpDAIτC L ττ +=+= , see Chapter 5 for detailed description of the 
function), the major findings of their model is that the inclusion of the 3rd party in the 
supply chain increases the retail price and decreases return rate, i.e., the inclusion of the 
3rd party is not recommended for the supply chain purely from the perspective of the 
profits and the remanufacturing.  
 
 On the other hand, the supply chain model with retailer as the Stackelberg leader and 
the 3rd party as the collecting agent (see Figure 12) was not investigated. We have the 
same assumption as that in the basic retailer-driven model. Also we assume that the profit 
of the 3rd party is 3PΠ -c)D(p)r(c)(d= . The solution of this retailer-driven 3rd party 
supply chain model could be easily obtained from the basic retailer-driven model 
discussed in the paper, by making some function transformations, i.e., changing the 
collecting function from r(c) to r(d) = r(c*(d)), where c*(d)= 3P
c
  arg ΠMax . Then we 
could follow the same solution procedure discussed in the Chapter 4 to derive a solution 
Manufacturer Retailer 
b 
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c 
p 
Figure 11. 3rd Party Collecting, Manufacturer-driven 
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for the retailer-driven 3rd party collecting model. We note the SOSC’s can be derived to 
check the optimality as in Chapter 3.  
 
 
Specifically, in the case of linear return rate function (r(c)=kc), we have =Π 3P  
)D(p)kc(d-c-c)D(p)r(c)(d = . To maximize 3PΠ , we have c*(d)=d/2. So we have r(d) 
=r(d/2)=kd/2= (k/2)d, which means that the retailer-driven 3rd party collecting model is 
equivalent to the basic retailer-driven (retailer-collecting) with half of the original k.  
From the above analysis, the impact of introducing the 3rd collecting party in the 
supply chain is equivalent to the case that the original k will be replaced by k/2 in the 
basic model, and the solution to the basic model is the solution of the retailer-driven 3rd 
party collecting model. Because the k is reduced to half, the impact is that the optimal λ is 
reduced if the return rate r(c)<1. Refer to Figure 4 to see the impact of the reduced k.  
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Figure 12. 3rd Party Collecting, Retailer-driven 
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CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Summary of the Paper 
In this paper, we studied the pricing strategy of a basic two-echelon closed-loop 
market-driven remanufacturing supply chain in different supply chain power structures, 
i.e., retailer-driven supply chain, centrally coordinated supply chain, the 
manufacturer-driven supply chain. We found that that the Stackelberg leader in the supply 
chain adopts a loss leader pricing policy towards the reverse flow by giving up the profit 
from the reverse flow and extracting the maximal profit from the forward flow only.  
In the retailer-driven model, we found that retailer sets the reverse flow price 
multiplier λ>1 to help the manufacturer to collect more used products. We showed the 
optimality analysis of the basic retailer-driven (retailer-collecting) model and the 
retailer-driven manufacturer-collecting model at λ=1.  Through numerical example, we 
showed that this loss leader pricing strategy is prevailing in retailer pricing decision.  
In the manufacturer-driven model, we demonstrate that the manufacturer sets *Mb =∆ 
to give up all the profit in the reverse flow. By doing this, the manufacturer could induce 
the retailer to reduce the retail price and thus increase demand, which make the 
manufacturer extract the maximal profit in the forward flow.  
We then discussed other issues of the models. We compared the retailer-driven model 
and the manufacturer-driven model and found that retailer-driven model has more 
efficiency and the retailer could extract more profit in terms of the percentage of the total 
supply chain profit. This advantage of the retailer coincides with the findings in many 
literatures and is attributed to being closer to customers. 
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We also showed two coordination mechanisms available to the Stackelberg leader in 
the supply chain: lump sum payment or an implicit understanding.  
For the policy implication, we showed that retailer-driven supply chain is preferred if 
maximizing the return rate of the used product is sought; whereas for maximization of the 
consumer surplus, the coordinated supply chain is the best.  
As an example of extending the basic models to more complicated models with 
different supply chain structure, a third party collecting model is briefly discussed.  
Some other interesting findings are also presented throughout the paper, e.g., the 
retailer-driven manufacturer-collecting model, the linear model solutions, the optimal 
return price b decision in retailer-driven model, etc.  
 
8.2 Future Work 
Because there are few research literatures regarding the super retailer and the 
remanufacturing practice in the supply chain, we believe there are many interesting open 
research area.  
For example, this paper is about the supply chain with remanufacturing in a steady 
state. A natural extension of this research is to investigate the evolution of the supply 
chain in a dynamic process from some initial state to the steady state. The equilibrium 
analysis of the steady state, e.g., the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, is also 
interesting. A multi-period discrete model or a continuous model of the supply chain is 
needed to model the process.  
The supply chain with remanufacturing could also contain multiple parties with 
  
55 
different gaming process, e.g., two or more competing manufacturers/remanufacturers, 
two or more retailers, multi-echelon supply chain. The combination is endless and all 
these models could be developed from the basic model discussed in this paper. It will be 
interesting to know whether the loss leader pricing policy is still observed in these 
extended models.  
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APPENDIX I. The Intermediate Solution of Max R∏  for the case of r(c)=1  
If the optimal c*>1/k from the optimization of ∏R in section 3.4, then that means that the 
return rate is within the infeasible region (i.e., r(c*)=kc*>1) and we need to adjust the 
solution to the bounded solution. Since the retailer has supply chain power, she will keep 
the manufacturer paying the return price *b ≡∆/2 while she lowers λ* to achieve r(c)=1, 
i.e., to keep the return rate r(c*)= kc*= kλ*b*=1, the optimal λ* will be set as λ*=2/(∆k). 
The manufacturer’s reaction function under λ=λ*=2/(∆k) can be found as follows 
4/)]/(2[),(* βλβ vucrcmw ++=  and 2/),(* ∆=λβb  
Notice that ),(* λβw  depends on β only and ),(* λβb  is actually independent on β and 
λ. The retailer’s problem is then 
β
ββββββ
kv
vcrcmcrcmvukvcrcmuMax R
16
}4)])(3()1(2[]{)(2[)( −++−+−+−=Π  (I.1) 
Expression (I.1) is a univariate polynomial and the optimal β* can be found using many 
optimization methods. After obtaining β* from (I.1) and considering λ*=2/(∆k), *b =∆/2, 
we can then find optimal w*= ),(* λβw , p*=β* *w , c*=λ*b*=1/k and the profit of each 
party and the total supply chain.  
 From the intermediate solution of section 3.4 and this appendix, we can find that the 
manufacturer will always set return price *b =∆/2, no matter whether the return rate hits 1 
or not. Also when the return rate hits 1, the retailer actually lowers the price multiplier λ 
to take all the savings. 
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APPENDIX II. Discussion of Maximization of Expression (6) 
It is difficult to derive a closed-form solution from maximization of Expression (6). For 
Expression (6) by solving ∂∏R/∂β=0, we obtain the optimal β as a function of λ (after 
deleting the other two imaginary roots) is  
 
By solving ∂∏R/∂λ=0, we obtain the optimal λ as a function of β is  
 
We find it is analytically difficult to solve {∂∏R/∂β=0, ∂∏R/∂λ=0}, and yield meaningful insights.  
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APPENDIX III. Proof of 0),(
),1( 1
>
∂
Π∂
>= ββλλ
βλR in the retailer-driven model 
For the case r(c)<1, from Expression (6), we have  
β
λβλββλββλβ
v
cmkvukvvcmuR
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The equation 0),(
),1(
=
∂
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= βλλ
βλR
 has two roots 
 )k - cm 4 ( v
u2
2∆
±=β . Let 
β1=
 )k - cm 4 ( v
u2
2∆
. It is apparent that 0),(
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=
∂
Π∂
== λββλ
λβR
 and 
0),(
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>
∂
Π∂
=> λββλ
λβR
.■ 
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APPENDIX IV. Proof of β2>β1 in the RDMC model. 
For the case of r(c)<1, from Expression (6), we have 
64
)4(
464
)4(
4
                  
64
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Apparently, −∞=Π
→
)(lim RRDMC0 ββ and −∞=Π∞→ )(lim
R
RDMC ββ (when 0k - cm 4 2 >∆ ).  
By solving  
0
64
41216)(
2
22222R
RDMC
=
−−−
=
∂
Π∂
vβ
)k∆cm)(β(βvu
β
β
 
We find that there are one real root and two imaginary roots.  
The real root is  
 
 
Two imaginary roots are 
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Because there is only one real root and −∞=Π
→
)(lim RRDMC0 ββ and −∞=Π∞→ )(lim
R
RDMC ββ , 
)(RRDMC βΠ  is concave in )0( >ββ  and a typical )(RRDMC βΠ  looks like in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. Retailer’s Profit Function in RDMC Model 
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On the other hand, the derivative of )(RRDMC βΠ at β1=
 )k - cm 4 ( v
u2
2∆
 is  
64/])4(vu44u4)[4()( 222
)(
R
RDMC
1
k∆cmk∆cmk∆cm −−+−−=
∂
Π∂
=βββ
β
 
It is apparent that if 0k - cm 4 2 >∆  and )k - cm v(4u 2∆>  (both inequalities are 
reasonable assumptions for practical parameter values because k is usually a small 
number, and u is usually a big number), then 0)(
)(
R
RDMC
1
>
∂
Π∂
=βββ
β
. Therefore, the 
optimal solution of Max )(RRDMC βΠ  is obtain at a point β2, which satisfies β2>β1.■ 
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APPENDIX V. Numerical Examples of Retailer-driven Model 
Numerical example with different k (k=0.05 to 1.6) and ∆ (∆=1,2,3) values: 
∆=1         
k r(c) λ β Retailer's Profit 
0.05 0.035 1.3987 3.8676 7889.217 
0.1 0.07 1.3994 3.8767 7896.738 
0.15 0.105 1.4002 3.886 7904.273 
0.2 0.1401 1.4009 3.8953 7911.821 
0.25 0.1752 1.4017 3.9047 7919.383 
0.3 0.2104 1.4024 3.9141 7926.958 
0.35 0.2456 1.4032 3.9236 7934.548 
0.4 0.2808 1.404 3.9332 7942.151 
0.45 0.3161 1.4048 3.9428 7949.768 
0.5 0.3514 1.4055 3.9526 7957.399 
0.55 0.3867 1.4063 3.9624 7965.045 
0.6 0.4221 1.4071 3.9722 7972.704 
0.65 0.4576 1.4079 3.9822 7980.378 
0.7 0.493 1.4087 3.9922 7988.066 
0.75 0.5286 1.4095 4.0023 7995.769 
0.8 0.5641 1.4103 4.0125 8003.486 
0.85 0.5997 1.4111 4.0228 8011.218 
0.9 0.6354 1.4119 4.0331 8018.964 
0.95 0.6711 1.4127 4.0435 8026.725 
1 0.7068 1.4136 4.054 8034.501 
1.05 0.7426 1.4144 4.0646 8042.292 
1.1 0.7784 1.4152 4.0753 8050.098 
1.15 0.8142 1.4161 4.0861 8057.919 
1.2 0.8501 1.4169 4.0969 8065.756 
1.25 0.8861 1.4178 4.1079 8073.608 
1.3 0.9221 1.4186 4.1189 8081.475 
1.35 0.9581 1.4195 4.13 8089.358 
1.4 0.9942 1.4203 4.1412 8097.256 
1.45 1 1.3793 4.1413 8104.972 
1.5 1 1.3333 4.1395 8112.184 
1.55 1 1.2903 4.1377 8118.931 
1.6 1 1.25 4.1361 8125.259 
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∆=2     
k r(c) λ β Retailer's Profit 
0.05 0.0700 1.4009 3.8953 7911.821 
0.10 0.1404 1.4040 3.9332 7942.151 
0.15 0.2111 1.4071 3.9722 7972.704 
0.20 0.2821 1.4103 4.0125 8003.486 
0.25 0.3534 1.4136 4.0540 8034.501 
0.30 0.4251 1.4169 4.0969 8065.756 
0.35 0.4971 1.4203 4.1412 8097.256 
0.40 0.5695 1.4238 4.1870 8129.007 
0.45 0.6423 1.4274 4.2344 8161.017 
0.50 0.7156 1.4311 4.2834 8193.291 
0.55 0.7892 1.4349 4.3343 8225.838 
0.60 0.8633 1.4388 4.3870 8258.664 
0.65 0.9378 1.4428 4.4418 8291.778 
0.70 1.0000 1.4286 4.4872 8325.115 
0.75 1.0000 1.3333 4.4785 8355.657 
0.80 1.0000 1.2500 4.4709 8382.408 
0.85 1.0000 1.1765 4.4642 8406.032 
0.90 1.0000 1.1111 4.4583 8427.049 
0.95 1.0000 1.0526 4.4530 8445.866 
1.00 1.0000 1.0000 4.4483 8462.812 
1.05 1.0000 0.9524 4.4440 8478.153 
1.10 1.0000 0.9091 4.4401 8492.106 
1.15 1.0000 0.8696 4.4366 8504.852 
1.20 1.0000 0.8333 4.4333 8516.54 
1.25 1.0000 0.8000 4.4303 8527.298 
1.30 1.0000 0.7692 4.4276 8537.231 
1.35 1.0000 0.7407 4.4250 8546.432 
1.40 1.0000 0.7143 4.4227 8554.978 
1.45 1.0000 0.6897 4.4205 8562.937 
1.50 1.0000 0.6667 4.4184 8570.368 
1.55 1.0000 0.6452 4.4165 8577.32 
1.60 1.0000 0.6250 4.4147 8583.84 
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∆=3     
k r(c) λ β Retailer's Profit 
0.05 0.1054 1.4048 3.9428 7949.768 
0.10 0.2118 1.4119 4.0331 8018.964 
0.15 0.3194 1.4195 4.1300 8089.358 
0.20 0.4282 1.4274 4.2344 8161.017 
0.25 0.5384 1.4359 4.3473 8234.018 
0.30 0.6502 1.4448 4.4699 8308.446 
0.35 0.7635 1.4544 4.6039 8384.397 
0.40 0.8787 1.4646 4.7511 8461.981 
0.45 0.9960 1.4755 4.9140 8541.324 
0.50 1.0000 1.3333 4.8974 8614.244 
0.55 1.0000 1.2121 4.8785 8674.048 
0.60 1.0000 1.1111 4.8628 8723.976 
0.65 1.0000 1.0256 4.8496 8766.288 
0.70 1.0000 0.9524 4.8384 8802.602 
0.75 1.0000 0.8889 4.8287 8834.109 
0.80 1.0000 0.8333 4.8203 8861.705 
0.85 1.0000 0.7843 4.8128 8886.074 
0.90 1.0000 0.7407 4.8062 8907.751 
0.95 1.0000 0.7018 4.8004 8927.16 
1.00 1.0000 0.6667 4.7951 8944.638 
1.05 1.0000 0.6349 4.7903 8960.459 
1.10 1.0000 0.6061 4.7860 8974.85 
1.15 1.0000 0.5797 4.7820 8987.995 
1.20 1.0000 0.5556 4.7784 9000.049 
1.25 1.0000 0.5333 4.7751 9011.142 
1.30 1.0000 0.5128 4.7721 9021.386 
1.35 1.0000 0.4938 4.7692 9030.874 
1.40 1.0000 0.4762 4.7666 9039.686 
1.45 1.0000 0.4598 4.7642 9047.894 
1.50 1.0000 0.4444 4.7619 9055.556 
1.55 1.0000 0.4301 4.7598 9062.725 
1.60 1.0000 0.4167 4.7578 9069.447 
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The sensitivity of the forward price multiplier β with respect to k and ∆ 
From the numerical examples above, we observe that: 
(1) when r(c)<1, optimal β increase in k; when r(c)>1, optimal β decreases in k; 
(2) the bigger the ∆, the less sensitive of optimal β with respect to k.  
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Figure 14. Optimal β vs. k and ∆ in Retailer-driven Model 
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The same Figure as Figure 5. Return Rate r(c) vs. k and ∆ in Retailer-driven Model 
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Numerical example with different v values (v=5 to 60): 
∆=2, k=0.15 
v r(c) λ β Retailer's Profit 
5 0.2740 1.8269 9.8248 42403.2600 
10 0.2391 1.5937 6.2241 19090.8900 
15 0.2219 1.4796 4.7809 11598.0600 
20 0.2111 1.4071 3.9722 7972.7040 
25 0.2033 1.3552 3.4449 5864.7960 
30 0.1973 1.3153 3.0694 4502.1820 
35 0.1925 1.2833 2.7862 3558.2730 
40 0.1885 1.2567 2.5638 2871.7910 
45 0.1851 1.2341 2.3836 2354.1980 
50 0.1822 1.2145 2.2342 1952.9850 
60 0.1773 1.1820 1.9998 1378.7830 
70 0.1734 1.1558 1.8232 995.4839 
80 0.1701 1.1341 1.6847 727.9104 
90 0.1673 1.1155 1.5727 535.1831 
100 0.1649 1.0994 1.4799 393.2848 
110 0.1628 1.0852 1.4017 287.2462 
120 0.1609 1.0726 1.3347 207.2915 
130 0.1592 1.0612 1.2767 146.7908 
140 0.1576 1.0509 1.2257 101.1045 
150 0.1562 1.0414 1.1807 66.8998 
160 0.1549 1.0327 1.1406 41.7282 
170 0.1537 1.0247 1.1046 23.7557 
180 0.1526 1.0173 1.0720 11.5854 
190 0.1515 1.0103 1.0425 4.1377 
199 0.1507 1.0045 1.0181 0.7697 
∆=2, k=0.4 
v r(c) λ β Retailer's Profit 
10 0.6472 1.6179 6.6177 19318.9400 
15 0.5996 1.4990 5.0565 11781.4900 
20 0.5695 1.4238 4.1870 8129.0070 
25 0.5481 1.3701 3.6221 6002.1390 
30 0.5316 1.3290 3.2210 4625.1710 
35 0.5184 1.2960 2.9191 3669.8140 
40 0.5075 1.2687 2.6823 2973.8610 
45 0.4982 1.2454 2.4909 2448.2190 
50 0.4901 1.2254 2.3323 2040.0200 
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APPENDIX VI. Solution Procedure of the Manufacturer-driven Model 
For Scenario M, we first derive some features of the retailer’s reaction functions; then we 
maximize the manufacturer’s profit by taking into account these reaction functions. The 
procedure is given as follows.  
Proof of Proposition 1. We first set ∂∏R/∂c=0 and ∂∏R/∂p=0 and find that the optimal c* 
and p* which maximize the retailer’s profit ∏R satisfy the following FONC 
r′(c)= r(c)/(b-c)         (VI.1) 
D′(p)= -D(p)/[p-w+(b-c)⋅r(c)]        (VI.2) 
Because the above optimization is performed under a given pair of b and w, and from 
(VI.1) and (VI.2), we know that c* is a function of b, and p* is a function of b and w. 
Rewrite (VI.1) and (VI.2) as implicit functions of b and w: 
r′(c(b))= r(c(b))/(b-c(b))        (VI.3) 
D′(p(w,b))= -D(p(w,b))/[p(w,b)-w+(b-c(b))⋅r(c(b))]     (VI.4) 
By differentiating the two sides of (VI.3) with respect to b, we can find 
c′(b)= r′(c(b))/[2 r′(c(b))-(b-c(b))⋅ r″(c(b))]      (VI.5) 
By differentiating the two sides of (VI.4) with respect to w and b respectively, we can 
find 
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w
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∂
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  (VI.7) 
To reflect the reaction function c*(b) and p*(w,b) in the manufacturer’s profit, we 
rewrite ∏M as ∏M(w,b)=D(p(w,b))⋅[w-cm+r(c(b))⋅(∆-b)]. We then calculate ∂∏M/∂w and 
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∂∏M/∂b and use (VI.3) to (VI.7) to replace the relevant terms. We find the following 
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where ))(())((),( bcrbbcbwpwX −+−=  Notice that ∂∏M/∂w is contained as a term in 
∂∏M/∂b. Set ∂∏M/∂w=0 and ∂∏M/∂b=0, we can get that  
0)),(())(()( =⋅+− bwpDbcrcrcmb       (VI.10) 
However D(p(w,b))=0 means that demand equals to 0 and r(c(b))=0 means degenerating 
the problem to the supply chain model with forward flow only; we consider both cases 
are infeasible (i.e., the two solutions out of the multiple solutions are infeasible to the 
problem). Therefore we conclude that the only feasible solution of Scenario M is when 
b*=cm-cr=∆  Here we also assume that the second order sufficient conditions at b*=∆ 
are satisfied to ensure the global optimum. ■ 
  
69 
APPENDIX VII. Proof of *Rb <∆=cm-cr in Scenario R 
In Scenario R, given the retailer’s announcement of β and λ, the manufacturer’s profit is 
)])(()[( ),( bbrcmwwDbwMR −∆+−=Π λβ . We can find that the optimal b is independent 
on w. For any given w and 0)( >wD β (feasibility requirement), we can find that 
),(),( ∆≥Π<∆<Π bwbw MRMR  because )( λbr >0 for nonzero b and λ (feasibility 
requirement). Therefore, the optimal *Rb <∆=cm-cr in Scenario R ■ 
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APPENDIX VIII. Optimal Prices and Profits in Scenario M 
From Proposition 1, we know that *Mb =∆. We now consider the other optimal prices 
in the supply chain in Scenario M. From Proposition 1 ( *Mb =∆) and the fact that optimal 
collecting price *Mc  is independent on retail price p (considering 
∏R=D(p)[p-w+r(c)(b-c)]), we can derive that )(Max  arg* cr(c)c
c
M −∆=  and thus 
**
CM cc = , i.e., the retailer will set the same collecting price c in Scenario C and Scenario 
M. Regarding the optimal wholesale price, we can find that *Mw >cm, because if *Mw ≤cm, 
then the manufacturer’s profit ∏M=D(p)⋅[w-cm+r(c)⋅(∆-b)] is non-positive (considering 
*
Mb =∆), which is infeasible in the manufacturer-driven supply chain where no 
coordination mechanism exists. Last, the optimal retail price *Mp  of Scenario M can be 
found as )])(()[(Max  arg **** MMM
p
M ccrwppDp −∆+−=  and satisfies that 
**
CM pp ≠  
We note here that ** CM pp >  when the condition )(")()('2 2 pDpDpD > is satisfied. 
 Considering *Mw ≠cm and *Mb =∆ in Scenario M, we can derive that the total supply 
chain profit of Scenario M is less than that of Scenario C, i.e., TMΠ <
T
CΠ . In other words, 
the supply chain in Scenario M as a system is less efficient or has more inefficiency than 
the supply chain in Scenario C. However, since ** CM cc =  (i.e., the reverse flow behaves 
the same system-wise in Scenario M and Scenario C) while ** CM pp ≠  (i.e., the forward 
flow behaves differently system-wise), the reverse flow in Scenario M actually causes no 
inefficiency and the supply chain inefficiency in Scenario M is entirely caused by the 
forward flow (The “inefficiency” in our model means the total supply chain profit loss in 
Scenario M and Scenario R compared to Scenario C). 
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APPENDIX IX. Proof of (w=cm, b=∆) to be a necessary condition for ∏T 
maximization in Scenario M 
To proof (w=cm, b=∆) is a necessary condition for ∏T maximization in Scenario M is 
equivalent to proof that if b≠∆ or w≠cm, then p≠ *Cp  or c≠
*
Cc . We proof it as two steps: 
(a) We first proof that no matter w=cm or w≠cm, if b≠∆ then c≠ *Cc .Consider ∏R=D(p) 
[p-w+r(c)(b-c)]. Given w and b, the optimal c* maximizing ∏R is independent on p and 
satisfies FONC r′(c*)(b-c*)-r(c*)=0, or  
*** )('/)( ccrcrb +=         (IX.1) 
(IX.1) shows that b and c* have one-to-one mapping relationship. We also know that if 
b=∆ then c= *Cc  (because of single optimum); therefore, we can find from (IX.1) that that 
if c= *Cc  then b=∆, or if b≠∆ then c≠
*
Cc . 
(b) We then proof that under b=∆, if w≠cm then p≠ *Cp . Under b=∆, *Ccc =  and ∏R= 
D(p)[p-w+r(c)(b-c)] =D(p)[p-w+r( *Cc )(∆- *Cc )]. The optimal p* which maximizes ∏R 
satisfies FONC D′(p*)[p*-w+r( *Cc )(∆- *Cc )]+D(p*)=0 or  
)('/)())(( ***** pDpDccrpw CC +−∆+=      (IX.2) 
(IX.2) shows that w and p* have one-to-one mapping relationship. Since (w=cm, b=∆) is a 
sufficient condition for ∏T maximization (p= *Cp , c= *Cc ), (IX.2) can be written as 
)('/)())(( ***** CCCCC pDpDccrpcm +−∆+= , which in turn means under b=∆, if p= *Cp  
then w=cm, or if w≠cm then p≠ *Cp . 
Considering (a) and (b), we can conclude that if b≠∆ or w≠cm, then p≠ *Cp  or c≠ *Cc , 
i.e., (w=cm, b=∆) is a necessary condition for ∏T maximization (p= *Cp , c= *Cc ). ■ 
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APPENDIX X. Proof of (β=1, λ=1) to be a necessary condition for ∏T maximization 
in Scenario R 
To proof (β=1, λ=1) is a necessary condition for ∏T maximization in Scenario R is 
equivalent to proof that if β≠1 or λ≠1, then p≠ *Cp  or c≠ *Cc . We proof it as two steps: 
(a) We first proof that no matter β=1 or β≠1, if λ≠1 then c≠ *Cc . Consider ∏M=D(p) 
[w-cm+r(c)(∆-b)]= D(wβ) [w-cm+r(λb)(∆-b)]. Given β and λ, we find that the optimal b* 
maximizing ∏M is independent on w and satisfies FONC r′(λb*)λ (∆-b*)-r(λb*)=0, or  
∆+∆= /])('/[)( *** ccrcrλ       (X.1) 
where c*=λb*. (X.1) shows that λ and c* have one-to-one mapping relationship. When 
λ=1, we find that c=b= *Cc , and (X.1) can be written as ∆+∆== /])('/[)(1 *** CCC ccrcrλ , 
which in turn means if *Ccc =  then λ=1, or if λ≠1 then c≠ *Cc . 
(b) We then proof that under λ=1, if β≠1 then p≠ *Cp . Under λ=1, *Cccb ==  and 
∏M=D(p) [w-cm+r(c)(∆-b)]= D(wβ) [w-cm+r( *Cc )(∆- *Cc )]. The optimal w* which 
maximizes ∏M satisfies FONC D′(wβ)β [w-cm+r( *Cc )(∆- *Cc )]+D(wβ)=0 or  
)])((/[])('/)([ ***** CC ccrcmppDpD −∆−+=β      (X.2) 
where p*=βw* (X.2) shows that β and p* have one-to-one mapping relationship. Since 
(β=1, λ=1) is a sufficient condition for ∏T maximization (p= *Cp , c= *Cc ), (X.2) can be 
written as )])((/[])('/)([1 ***** CCCCC ccrcmppDpD −∆−+==β , which in turn means 
under λ=1, if p= *Cp  then β=1, or if β≠1 then p≠ *Cp . 
 Considering (a) and (b), we can conclude that if β≠1 or λ≠1, then p≠ *Cp  or c≠ *Cc ., 
i.e., (β=1, λ=1) is a necessary condition for ∏T maximization (p= *Cp , c= *Cc ). ■ 
 
  
73 
APPENDIX XI. Retailer-driven model with forward flow only 
 
In the retailer-driven model with forward flow only (see Figure 15), the manufacturer’s 
profit is ( )( ) ( )( )M D p w cm D w w cmβΠ = − = − ; the retailer’s profit is 
( )( ) ( )( )R D p p w D w w wβ βΠ = − = − .  
 Consider the linear demand function form, i.e., ( )D p u vp= − . By solving 
/ 0M w∂Π ∂ = , we find the manufacturer’s reaction function is ( ) /(2 ) / 2w u v cmβ β= + . 
By taking into account the manufacturer’s reaction function, the retailer’s profit is  
2 2 2 2( 1)( )
4
R u v cm
v
β β
β
− −Π =  
We could solve the FONC / 0R β∂Π ∂ =  and then check the SOSC of the FONC 
satisfying point to determine the optimal solution of the problem.  
 Using the same parameter values in the numerical example in Section 4.1, i.e., 
u=1000, v=20, cm=5, we find that retailer’s problem in the retailer-driven model with 
forward flow only is  
2 2 2 2 2( 1)( ) 125( 1)(100 )
4
R u v cm
v
β β β β
β β
− − − −Π = =  
By solving the FONC and checking the SOSC, we find the optimal * 3.858β = . The 
retailer’s profit is RΠ =7881.71.  
Manufacturer Retailer 
D(p) w 
p=βw 
Forward Flow 
Figure 15. Retailer-driven Model with Forward Flow Only 
cm   
Customers 
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